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Abstract
Background: Extraordinary infection control measures limited access to medical care in the
Greater Toronto Area during the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak. The
objective of this study was to determine if the period of these infection control measures was
associated with changes in overall population mortality due to causes other than SARS.
Methods: Observational study of death registry data, using Poisson regression and interrupted
time-series analysis to examine all-cause mortality rates (excluding deaths due to SARS) before,
during, and after the SARS outbreak. The population of Ontario was grouped into the Greater
Toronto Area (N = 2.9 million) and the rest of Ontario (N = 9.3 million) based upon the level of
restrictions on delivery of clinical services during the SARS outbreak.
Results: There was no significant change in mortality in the Greater Toronto Area before, during,
and after the period of the SARS outbreak in 2003 compared to the corresponding time periods
in 2002 and 2001. The rate ratio for all-cause mortality during the SARS outbreak was 0.99 [95%
Confidence Interval (CI) 0.93–1.06] compared to 2002 and 0.96 [95% CI 0.90–1.03] compared to
2001. An interrupted time series analysis found no significant change in mortality rates in the
Greater Toronto Area associated with the period of the SARS outbreak.
Conclusion: Limitations on access to medical services during the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto
had no observable impact on short-term population mortality. Effects on morbidity and long-term
mortality were not assessed. Efforts to contain future infectious disease outbreaks due to influenza
or other agents must consider effects on access to essential health care services.
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Background
In March 2003, the health care system in Toronto, Can-
ada, was confronted with an outbreak of Severe Acute Res-
piratory Syndrome (SARS), a highly contagious and severe
atypical pneumonia. [1-3] The infection control measures
employed in response to this crisis were extraordinary and
unprecedented. Actions to control SARS in the Greater
Toronto Area included the closure of four hospitals, the
cancellation of all non-emergency surgical services, an
almost complete curtailment of inter-hospital patient
transfers, and the postponement of most hospital-based
outpatient clinics. [4,5] Moreover, access to physicians,
hospital laboratories, imaging studies, and other high-
technology services was limited by infection control pro-
cedures. [5] The effect of these measures on access to
health care was underscored by media reports of inappro-
priate delays for cancer therapy and the inability to per-
form urgent surgeries, sometimes resulting in death. [6-9]
The effects of widespread limitations of access to medical
services have been studied from different perspectives.
Studies of influenza outbreaks from the early 20th century
provide insight into healthcare restrictions and are appli-
cable to the SARS experience because both are contagious
respiratory illnesses with high mortality rates that are
largely controlled through isolation procedures. Previous
work has documented increased cardiovascular and other
non-influenza related deaths during influenza outbreaks.
[10-12] However, these increases were likely related to the
effects of the infection itself rather than limited access to
care. [13-17] Studies of diminished health care access due
to withdrawal of medical services during physicians'
strikes have documented significant alterations in health
service utilization, intermediate outcomes, and various
health-related processes of care. [18-20] However, no rig-
orous study has examined the effects of physician job
action on overall population mortality. [21]
While there is little debate regarding the necessity of a
concerted response to control the SARS outbreak, the
delivery of health care to the general population was
clearly reduced. Evidence suggests that in Toronto more
essential services were less affected than services for low-
acuity conditions. [5] An important question is whether
sharply curtailed access to health care had an impact on
population mortality due to causes other than SARS. This
issue will be highly relevant in the event of a future infec-
tious disease emergency, such as a recurrence of SARS, a
highly virulent influenza epidemic, avian flu, the emer-
gence of a new infectious organism, or a bioterrorist attack
with an agent such as smallpox. We therefore sought to
determine if the infection control measures undertaken
during the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto were associ-
ated with a change in overall population mortality.
Methods
Chronology of the SARS outbreak in Toronto
In early March 2003, a Toronto resident returned from
Hong Kong infected with SARS. She died at home but
spread the virus to her family members, who initiated the
outbreak when they were admitted to hospital. However,
since our intent was to estimate the effect of the public
health containment measures on the overall population,
we defined the period of the SARS outbreak as beginning
on March 27, 2003 (the 13th week of the year). [4] On this
date, the province of Ontario declared a state of emer-
gency and issued special directives to all hospitals in the
Greater Toronto Area (City of Toronto, York Region, Dur-
ham Region, Peel Region, Halton Region, and Simcoe
County) instructing them to curtail inter-hospital trans-
fers, elective surgery, and outpatient services. [22] As a
result, health care utilization in the Greater Toronto Area
decreased significantly. [5] Inpatient procedures such as
abdominal aortic aneurysm repairs, cholecystectomies,
and joint replacement surgeries decreased by 24–55%.
Cardiac surgeries and percutaneous coronary interven-
tions decreased by about 40%. Outpatient procedures
such as breast biopsies, chemotherapy infusions, and
vasectomies decreased by 16–93%. Outpatient diagnostic
tests such as MRI and CT scans decreased by 34–51%.
Outpatient physician visits decreased by 16% overall, and
emergency department visits decreased by 25%. In con-
trast, medical care in the area of Ontario outside of the
Greater Toronto Area had increased infection control
measures but comparatively little restriction of clinical
services. We defined the end of the SARS outbreak as July
2, 2003 (the 27th week of the year), because this was the
date that the World Health Organization removed
Toronto from its list of SARS-affected areas.
Death certificate data
Death certificate data for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003
were obtained from the provincial death registry. All
deaths in Ontario are recorded in this registry. Data
obtained from each death certificate included the
decedent's date of birth, sex, place of death, and date of
death. Because our goal was to examine the indirect effects
of SARS through its impact on the health care system, we
subtracted the 44 deaths in Ontario due to SARS from the
death certificate database before performing further anal-
yses.
Census data
National census data from Statistics Canada were used to
determine the age-specific population of the Greater
Toronto Area and the rest of Ontario at the midpoint of
2001, 2002, and 2003. To adjust for population growth,
we used linear interpolation to estimate age-specific pop-
ulation in each week of 2001, 2002, and 2003. The total
population of the Greater Toronto Area at the midpoint ofBMC Public Health 2007, 7:93 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/93
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2003 was 2.93 million, and the total population of the
rest of Ontario at the midpoint of 2003 was 9.30 million.
Mortality rates
We combined death certificate and census data to calcu-
late weekly age-specific mortality rates in the Greater
Toronto Area and the rest of Ontario. Because the begin-
ning of the 2003 SARS outbreak (as defined for the pur-
pose of this study) occurred 12 weeks after the beginning
of the year, we compared mortality rates for the 12-week
period before the beginning of the outbreak, the outbreak
period, and the 12-week period after the end of the out-
break. Mortality rates were calculated for the correspond-
ing weeks in 2001 and 2002. Rates were expressed as
deaths per week per 100,000 population. The two pre-
specified primary analyses were based on total mortality
in males and females of all ages, and total mortality in
males and females age 65 years and over. These rates were
not age- or sex-standardized because the age and sex struc-
ture of the population did not change significantly during
the study period.
Statistical analyses
We used two statistical approaches, Poisson regression
and interrupted time series analysis. Poisson regression
was used to compare weekly mortality rates in 2003 with
corresponding weekly mortality rates in 2001 and 2002.
The dependent variable was the log of the rtio of the
observed to expected mortality rates. Generalized estima-
tion equations were used to adjust for possible serial cor-
relations.
We used interrupted time-series analyses to test for effects
of the SARS outbreak on mortality rates. [23,24] Time-
series analysis consists of several techniques for modeling
autocorrelation in temporally sequenced data. [25] The
Holt-Winters forecasting method was used to predict the
mortality rate per 100,000 person-years during and after
the SARS outbreak. This method takes into account both
time trends and seasonal fluctuations within timeseries
data. The 95% confidence intervals for predicted mortality
rates were generated using this method and then com-
pared to observed mortality rates.
Our primary analysis tested for a pulse-function effect
with a delay of four weeks in the onset of changes in mor-
tality rates at the beginning and end of the SARS outbreak.
The four week delay was chosen as a best estimate of the
lag between the beginning of the SARS emergency and
onset of overall health effects. Sensitivity analyses were
performed by varying the lag period from two weeks to six
weeks. All statistical analyses were performed using SAS
version 8.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, N.C.). This study was
approved by the Research Ethics Board of St. Michael's
Hospital.
Results
During the period of the SARS outbreak between March
27 and July 2, 2003, there were 8,619 deaths in the
Greater Toronto Area and 14,601 deaths in the rest of
Ontario. The corresponding values were 8,350 and
14,677 in the year 2002, and 8,427 and 14,771 in the year
2001. The number of deaths in the Greater Toronto Area
before, during, and after the 2003 SARS outbreak and the
corresponding periods in 2001 and 2002 are shown in
Figure 1. Figure 2 shows observed mortality rates in the
Greater Toronto Area in 2003. The 95% confidence inter-
vals are displayed for the expected mortality rate after the
start of the SARS outbreak, based on the Holt-Winter
method. The interrupted time series analysis found no sig-
nificant change in mortality rates in the Greater Toronto
Area associated with the period of the SARS outbreak in
2003, as indicated by the fact that the observed rates
remained almost entirely within the 95% CI for the pre-
dicted rates.
Adjusted analyses
The Poisson regression analysis found no significant
change in mortality before, during, and after the period of
the SARS outbreak in 2003 compared to the correspond-
ing time periods in 2002 and 2001 (Table 1). The rate
ratio for overall population mortality in the Greater
Toronto Area was 0.99 [95% Confidence Interval (CI)
0.93–1.06] when mortality during the SARS outbreak in
2003 was compared to the corresponding time period in
2002. The rate ratio was 0.96 [95% CI 0.90–1.03] when
mortality during the SARS outbreak in 2003 was com-
pared to the corresponding time period in 2001. The rate
ratio for overall population mortality in the rest of
Ontario during the SARS outbreak was 0.97 [95% CI
0.91–1.02] when compared to 2002 and 0.97 [95% CI
0.92–1.02] when compared to 2001. The analysis of mor-
tality rates among people aged 65 years and over also
found no statistically significant changes (Table 1). A sen-
Weekly number of deaths in the Greater Toronto Area Figure 1
Weekly number of deaths in the Greater Toronto Area.
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sitivity analysis in which the lag period was varied from 2
weeks to 6 weeks yielded similar results.
Discussion
We examined overall mortality for the region most
affected by the extraordinary infection control measures
taken to contain the Toronto SARS outbreak in 2003.
Despite a prolonged period of intense clinical service
restrictions, we found no significant change in mortality
rates compared with corresponding periods in previous
years. The widespread limitation of access to medical serv-
ices did not appear to have any short-term effects on
deaths within the population.
Did the infection control measures and policies employed
to control the SARS outbreak produce collateral damage
to the delivery of health care to the population? The con-
tainment strategy did result in dramatic decreases in non-
urgent inpatient and outpatient procedures and surgeries,
outpatient diagnostic tests, and overall physician visits.
[5] Although overall emergency department visits
declined substantially during the SARS outbreak, this
decline apparently reflected significant reductions in the
volume of patients with low-acuity complaints. [5,26]
Hospitalizations in Toronto during this period were 12%
lower than expected, representing a relatively modest
decrease. [27]
Studies conducted in other jurisdictions suggest that the
changes in health care delivery and care-seeking behavior
associated with the SARS outbreak may have had negative
health effects. In Taiwan, use of ambulatory care fell by
24%, inpatient care decreased by 35%, and childbirths
shifted from larger medical centers to less well-equipped
district hospitals and clinics. [28,29] In Hong Kong, the
number of individuals diagnosed with active tuberculosis
decreased significantly during the outbreak, suggesting
that the population's avoidance of medical care led to
delays in diagnosis. [30] On the other hand, another study
conducted in Hong Kong found that the proportion of
positive samples for influenza and respiratory viruses
other than SARS decreased significantly during the SARS
outbreak, a change that the investigators attributed to the
population's heightened attention to respiratory hygiene.
[31] Because these acute viral infections can lead to seri-
ous complications among individuals with chronic medi-
Table 1: Poisson regression analyses of mortality rates.
Adjusted Mortality Rate Ratio (95% CI)
2003 – Period Before SARS 2003 – Period During SARS 2003 – Period After SARS
Greater Toronto Area
All ages Compared to 2001 0.99 (0.91 – 1.08) 0.96 (0.90 – 1.03) 1.00 (0.92 – 1.10)
Compared to 2002 1.05 (0.97 – 1.14) 0.99 (0.93 – 1.06) 1.01 (0.93 – 1.10)
Age 65 and over Compared to 2001 0.99 (0.90 – 1.09) 0.97 (0.90 – 1.04) 1.00 (0.91 – 1.09)
Compared to 2002 1.06 (0.97 – 1.17) 0.99 (0.92 – 1.07) 0.98 (0.90 – 1.07)
Rest of Ontario
All ages Compared to 2001 1.05 (0.99 – 1.12) 0.97 (0.92 – 1.02) 0.98 (0.93 – 1.04)
Compared to 2002 1.07 (1.01 – 1.14) 0.97 (0.91 – 1.02) 0.97 (0.91 – 1.03)
Age 65 and over Compared to 2001 1.05 (0.99 – 1.11) 0.94 (0.88 – 1.01) 0.95 (0.89 – 1.02)
Compared to 2002 1.06 (1.00 – 1.13) 0.95 (0.89 – 1.02) 0.95 (0.89 – 1.02)
Adjusted mortality rate ratios compare mortality rates for periods in 2003 before, during, and after the SARS outbreak to the corresponding time 
periods in 2001 and 2002.
Weekly mortality rate per 100,000 population in the Greater  Toronto Area Figure 2
Weekly mortality rate per 100,000 population in the Greater 
Toronto Area. Dashed lines indicate the beginning and end of 
the SARS period. Observed mortality rates are indicated by 
squares and circles. Solid lines indicate the forecasted mor-
tality rate and 95% confidence intervals.
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cal conditions, this trend may have had a beneficial effect
on the overall mortality rate.
Our data are consistent with the assertion that patients
with severe illnesses retained the ability to access life-sav-
ing services during the SARS outbreak in Toronto. Fortu-
nately, the 2003 outbreak was relatively short-lived and
limited in scope. Future outbreaks of influenza or other
emerging infectious diseases may be much more severe
and prolonged. The establishment of data capture and
reporting systems in advance of such an event would pro-
vide decision-makers with timely information on possible
increases in morbidity and mortality attributable to
impaired health care access, in addition to data on the
direct effects of the outbreak itself. This information could
be used to determine which services should be prioritized
during a period of severely restricted health services.
This work has certain limitations. First, our study was
designed to detect increases in short-term mortality that
would constitute an immediate health challenge, but not
longer-term effects. Although such delayed consequences
are not implausible, they would be difficult to identify
and attribute to impaired access to care during the SARS
outbreak. Second, our study did not consider outcomes
such as health status, quality of life, or other measures of
morbidity that may have been affected by SARS-related
infection control measures. Instead, we focused on mor-
tality, an outcome that is both readily measured and of
unquestioned importance. Future studies are needed to
assess the effects of extraordinary infection control meas-
ures on morbidity. Third, we chose a clinically plausible
lag of four weeks before the onset of change in mortality
rates for our interrupted time-series analysis. The selection
of a different lag period might have resulted in slightly dif-
ferent findings, although our results were corroborated by
the Poisson regression analysis. Finally, this study exam-
ines a "natural experiment" in which restrictions on
health care services were not applied uniformly, instanta-
neously, or in a randomized manner. Nonetheless, our
use of a control group consisting of the population of
Ontario outside the Greater Toronto Area, which was not
affected by severe restrictions on access to hospital-based
care, serves to minimize this potential bias.
Conclusion
A coordinated response to severe infectious disease out-
breaks requires an approach that balances an infection
control mandate with the need to preserve access to essen-
tial health services. In the situation of a widespread dis-
ease outbreak, health care decision-makers
understandably concentrate upon the immediate threat of
the infectious disease. The SARS experience in Toronto
suggests that the preservation of the delivery of health care
for other urgent conditions is equally important. This con-
cept is particularly relevant because future infectious dis-
ease outbreaks, such as avian influenza or a bioterrorist
attack, could limit access to health care resources to a
much greater extent than did the SARS outbreak. Further
research is needed to examine the possible effects of such
events on cause-specific mortality rates and on health out-
comes other than mortality.
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